Information asymmetry and 360-Degree Contracts in the Recorded Music Industry by Bacache-Beauvallet, Maya et al.
 
Revue d'économie industrielle 
156 | 4e trimestre 2016
L'économie numérique en question
Information asymmetry and 360-Degree Contracts









Date of publication: 31 December 2016





Maya Bacache-Beauvallet, Marc Bourreau and François Moreau, « Information asymmetry and 360-
Degree Contracts in the Recorded Music Industry », Revue d'économie industrielle [Online], 156 | 4e
trimestre 2016, Online since 31 December 2018, connection on 12 October 2020. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/rei/6446  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/rei.6446 
© Revue d’économie industrielle
R E V U E D ’ÉC O N O MIE IND U S T R IE L L E ➻  N ° 15 6  ➻  4 E T R IME S T R E 2 016 57
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
AND 360-DEGREE CONTRACTS 
IN THE RECORDED MUSIC INDUSTRY1
Maya Bacache-Beauvallet2, Marc Bourreau3, François Moreau4
 Keywords: Information asymmetry, Contracts, Recorded music indus-
try, 360-degree deals.1234
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1990s, recorded music sales have collapsed, whereas other 
music revenues such as performance rights (especially from radio and TV 
broadcasters), synchronization rights (when recorded music is used in a 
movie for instance), and above all concert revenues have increased. For 
instance, between 2006 and 2011, worldwide live music revenues increased 
from $16.6 billion to $23.5 billion5 (+ 42%), while recorded music sales 
dropped from $22.4 billion to $16.6 billion6 (– 26%).
1 This research received financial support from the French National Research Agency 
(ANR-08-CORD-018).
2 Telecom ParisTech, Department of Economics and Social Sciences, F-75013 Paris, 
France. E-mail: maya.bacache@telecom-paristech.fr.
3 Telecom ParisTech, Department of Economics and Social Sciences, F-75013 Paris, 
France. E-mail: marc.bourreau@telecom-paristech.fr.
4 University Paris 13, Sorbonne Paris Cité, CEPN (CNRS, UMR 7234) and Labex ICCA. 
F-93430 Villetaneuse, France. E-mail: francois.moreau@univ-paris13.fr [correspond-
ing author].
5 This figure includes concert tickets sales, tour merchandising, music event sponsor-
ships and other forms of concert-related revenues. Source: eMarketer (Global Music - 
Tuning Into New Opportunities).
6 Source: International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI).
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Up to now, the record companies’ business model has relied mainly on 
recorded music sales, which increased worldwide by 34.5% between 
1991 and 2000. Record companies, and especially the three “majors” 
(Universal/EMI, Sony, Warner), which account for about 75% of worldwide 
music sales, used to view live music as useful only to the extent that it 
increased recorded music sales.7 One reaction of record labels to the down-
turn in music sales has been to try to change the contractual terms gov-
erning their relationship with artists, and to obtain a share of the grow-
ing revenue streams usually returned to artists (e.g., revenues from live 
music). This has given rise to so-called 360-degree deals, also called “multi-
ple rights deals” or “equity deals”, under which record labels receive a per-
centage of the earnings not only from record sales but also from concerts, 
merchandise sales, endorsement deals, etc. In exchange, the labels under-
take to fund and manage these activities and to develop new opportuni-
ties for the artists.
The British pop star Robbie Williams signed one of the first 360-degree 
contracts in 2002 with EMI. However, this model began to receive a lot of 
attention when Live Nation signed a highly publicized $120 million deal 
with Madonna (Karubian, 2009, p. 422). In 2008, Warner Music Group CEO 
Edgar Bronfman announced that his label “now requires all new artists to sign 
360 deals, and about a third of their already-signed artists are under such contracts.”8 
Hence, whereas in early deals artists had the choice not to sign a 360-degree 
contract, and received massive advances for the assignment of their rights 
(to compensate for the earnings in ancillary markets they signed away), 
most artists signing 360-degree contracts today do not obtain much in the 
way of advances and are often not given the choice of another type of deal.
Among the abundant academic literature devoted to the analysis of the 
impact of digitization on the music industry9, a specific stream deals 
with the impact of music piracy on ancillary markets, especially on 
7 This is why they used to provide artists with tour support without expecting any 
return on concert revenues.
8 http://techcrunch.com/2008/11/08/360-music-deals-become-mandatory-as-labels-
prepare-for-free-music/ (accessed January 19, 2015).
9 The bulk of this literature focuses on music piracy, from either a theoretical perspec-
tive (see Belleflamme and Peitz (2012) for a survey) or an empirical perspective (see 
Waldfogel (2012) for a survey).
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the live music market. Gayer and Shy (2006), Curien and Moreau (2009) 
and Dewenter et al. (2012) show that due to the existence of a positive 
externality from the recorded music market to the live music market,10 
file- sharing, while possibly hurting records sales, should enhance reve-
nues from the live music market by increasing the audience of artists.11 
Likewise, 360-degree contracts should be considered as profit-enhancing 
for both artists and record companies, since they allow the internaliza-
tion of market externalities between the recorded music market and ancil-
lary markets, especially the live music market. For an artist, releasing an 
album with a record label is a necessary condition to obtain radio airplay 
and to benefit from marketing expenses. This of course favors recorded 
music sales but in turn it also helps the artist to find dates for live shows 
(producers of live concerts take a signature with a record label as a signal 
of credibility) and to fill the concert venues (thanks to airplays and mar-
keting expenses). Craig Kallman, chairman of Atlantic Records, sums up 
these market externalities as follows: “If we weren’t so mono-focused on the sell-
ing of recorded music, we could actually take a really holistic approach to the devel-
opment of an artist brand.”12 However, a decade after their first appearance, 
360-degree contracts are still very far from representing a significant rev-
enue stream for the recorded music industry. According to the BPI (the 
trade organisation of the British recorded music industry), equity deals 
generated extra revenue of £76 million for UK record companies in 2011 
(an increase of 14% on the previous year). However, they still represent 
less than 8% of the total revenue of UK record labels,13 and record com-
panies seem to encounter difficulties in implementing such 360-degree 
deals.
10 The existence of such an externality from recorded music to live music consump-
tion is empiricaly validated by Montoro-Pons and Cuadrado-Garcia (2011). Note that 
Dewenter et al. (2012) consider the positive externalities between live music and 
recorded music in both directions.
11 Mortimer et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that file-sharing does indeed 
increase live music revenues, at least for the less well-known artists (for “stars”, the 
impact is negligible). Using survey data, Bacache-Beauvallet et al. (2015) show that 
for artists under contract with a record company, the more they perform on stage, 
the more tolerant towards file-sharing they are.
12 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/arts/music/11leed.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0 (accessed June 8, 2016).
13 http://www.bpi.co.uk/media-centre/diversifying-income-streams-boost-2011-re-
cords-lab.aspx (accessed January 19, 2015).
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Our paper aims to investigate this paradox. What makes artists reluctant 
to sign contracts that should theoretically be profit-enhancing for them? 
We argue that 360-degree deals face a major obstacle to their development 
due to an information problem that arises in the contractual relations 
between artists and their record companies. Artists suffer from an infor-
mation asymmetry on the actual revenue their recorded music generates, 
allowing their record labels to increase their bargaining power in terms 
of income-sharing. We argue that this makes artists reluctant to share all 
their revenue with a label as required by 360-degree deals, and this pre-
vents these efficient contracts from being implemented.
As stressed by Dionne (2013), the empirical measurement of information 
problems is a difficult task. Researchers are not privy to more informa-
tion than decision-makers: the information not observable for the unin-
formed agent is not observable for the econometrician either. Two solu-
tions have been adopted to overcome this difficulty: (1) using confidential 
surveys, and (2) developing econometric strategies that can isolate the 
desired effect. Our empirical strategy mixes these two solutions. From 
a survey, we obtained information on various characteristics of a repre-
sentative sample of several hundred music artists. Although information 
asymmetry is not directly observable, we argue that we can use proxies to 
evaluate the effects of information asymmetry and explain the attitude of 
artists towards 360-degree deals, conditional on a wide range of observed 
characteristics. These proxies are based on the contractual situation of an 
artist (allowing us to distinguish lesser and better informed artists) and 
on the extent of his ancillary revenues (allowing us to approximate his 
opportunity cost).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the way 
traditional contracts are designed in the recorded music industry, pre-
sents 360-degree contracts, and introduces our research hypotheses. The 
data are presented in Section 3, while Section 4 is devoted to our empirical 
strategy and our estimation results. The results are discussed in Section 5 
and Section 6 concludes.
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2. CONTRACTS IN THE RECORDED MUSIC 
INDUSTRY
In this section we describe how standard record contracts work in the 
music industry. We show that they involve an information asymmetry 
between artists and record labels that strengthens the latter’s bargain-
ing power in income sharing. Whereas such contracts should in theory 
be profit-enhancing for both parties, we argue that the fear of being in a 
weak bargaining position for all of their revenue streams reduces the will-
ingness of artists to sign 360-degree contracts. We then propose two testa-
ble hypotheses to explain this puzzle.
2.1. Standard record contracts
Releasing an album is a highly risky process. The “nobody knows” rule 
states that in cultural industries, the success of a project is highly unpre-
dictable (Caves, 2000). Due to the nature of music as an experience good, 
the potential value of an album remains unknown until it is released. 
Not surprisingly, the standard contract between a record company and 
a music artist shares the risk between both parties. The artist receives a 
percentage of record sales (royalties), while the record company funds the 
fixed costs of releasing the album (mainly in the form of recording, pro-
motion and distribution costs). The record company may also pay the art-
ist an “advance against royalties” (which is recoupable) while recording 
the album (Krasilovsky and Shemel, 2003). This sort of contract raises two 
potential issues. First, in its negotiation with the artist the record com-
pany could take advantage of the information asymmetry on the actual 
revenues an album generates. Second, these contracts turn out to be subop-
timal, since they do not take into account the positive externality between 
the recorded music market and the live music market. We discuss these 
two issues in more detail below.
2.1.1. Bargaining power and income-sharing
A typical record contract generates a strong information asymmetry 
between the record company and the artist. The amount of record sales, 
which determines the artist’s royalties, remains unobservable to the artist, 
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“because the label keeps the books that determine the earnings remitted to the artist” 
(Caves, 2000, p. 65). For instance, “in a long dispute between the Beatles and 
EMI and its U.S. subsidiary Capitol, undercounts of sales for royalty calculation were 
alleged, as were transfers of ‘free’ promotional records to subsidiaries that released 
them for commercial sale” (Caves, 2000, p. 65). This information asymme-
try, which provides music labels with a strong advantage in the bargain-
ing for income sharing, is well-documented by industry professionals. For 
instance, according to George Howard, former president of Rykodisc (now 
a subsidiary of Warner Music Group)14 “if you don’t believe this information 
asymmetry still exists, […] get your hands on a royalty statement from most labels 
to artists. I defy you to make heads or tails out of it, even if you’re an accountant 
and it’s your money.” He adds that “virtually every artist believes that any agree-
ment presented to them by a label/publisher is severely skewed in the favor of the label. 
Whether this is true or not is irrelevant; it speaks to the lack of ethical fiber – based on 
information asymmetry and lack of transparency – endemic to this business.”
Furthermore, the effective value of the nominal royalty rate is reduced 
by what Passman (2003) calls a series of “cheats” that the labels include in 
the standard contract. For instance, the royalty rate is reduced by an arbi-
trary “packaging charge” or, until recently, by a breakage charge intro-
duced in the 1950s when music was recorded on fragile shellac records 
(Caves, 2000). Moreover, if the album is successful enough for the art-
ist’s share of the profits to exceed the advance, the artist will have to 
reimburse the whole advance to the label. Music video production costs 
($50,000 to $100,000) and about half of marketing and promotion costs 
are also recoupable (Karubian, 2009). Finally, most contracts specify that 
if the costs of one album remain unrecouped, the deficit can be repaid 
from the excess earnings of a past or future album. This is called “cross-
collateralization”. Hence, incurring substantial costs in recording one 
album could leave an artist in debt for the rest of his major label career 
(Karubian, 2009).
How can we explain the persistence of such unfavorable – and possibly 
unfair15 – contractual terms that prevent artists from collecting a signif-
14 http://blog.tunecore.com/2011/07/information-asymmetry-in-the-recorded-music-
business.html (accessed January 19, 2015).
15 Klein (1980) emphasizes that some contractual provisions, “although voluntarily agreed 
upon in the face of significant competition”, can be considered as unfair.
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icant share of the revenues their albums generate? The first explanation 
is that up to now artists did not have any viable outside options. In an oli-
gopoly such as the recorded music market, controlled by a few major com-
panies, not being signed by one of the majors means being deprived of 
the benefit of significant promotion and marketing expenses and (most of 
the time) radio airplay, which has long been the main driver of recorded 
music sales (Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2005). Hence, until the 1990s, only low-
potential artists chose to self-release their albums (Burke, 1997). The sec-
ond and probably the main reason is that even if it produces no direct rev-
enue for the artist, recording an album generates positive externalities on 
ancillary markets, especially on the live music market (see, among others, 
Gayer and Shy, 2006). This is why for an unsigned artist “any deal is a good 
deal” (Karubian, 2009, p. 437). Radio airplay, video broadcasts, advertis-
ing and media interviews, which are usually made possible by the release 
of an album with a music label, are also very favorable to the live music 
careers of artists. It is indeed on stage that most artists make the bulk of 
their revenues (Connolly and Krueger, 2007).16
2.1.2. The suboptimality of standard record contracts
The existence of positive externalities between the recorded music mar-
ket and the live music market, in both directions, makes standard record 
contracts suboptimal because these externalities are not internalized.17 
360-degree deals (where the recording company manages both activities) 
and self-releasing albums (where the artist manages both activities) are 
two forms of vertical integration that allow these market externalities 
to be internalized and that could lead to higher aggregate profits than 
running each activity separately. Dewenter et al. (2012) show that under 
pervasive piracy, the integration of record and concert management can 
lead to higher profits for the label. In a theoretical setting with no mar-
16 Concerts provide a much larger source of income for artists than record sales or pub-
lishing royalties. Connolly and Krueger (2007) report that 73% of the average income 
for 35 top artists who toured in 2002 came from live concerts, while less than 10% 
came from recording sales and 7% from publishing rights.
17 Only the positive externality from the live music market towards the recorded music 
market was internalized to some extent, since in some contracts the record company 
provided the artist with “tour support”. Performing live was considered to boost 
recorded music sales.
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ket expansion, they show that significant network effects from concert 
attendance on record sales lead labels to charge higher prices in the con-
cert ticket market. Stimulating record sales by reducing concert ticket 
prices is less rewarding with pervasive piracy. Curien and Moreau (2009) 
also show in a theoretical model that artists could benefit from sharing 
their ancillary revenues with their record companies, which should lead 
to wider exposure through higher quality releases. The artist then ben-
efits from an increase in the demand for CDs, as well as for live perfor-
mances and ancillary goods.
Yet up to now, neither self-releasing nor 360-degree deals have been consid-
ered relevant business models in the recorded music industry. As pointed 
out above, self-releasing an album used to be a very risky strategy, since 
it often denies the artist access to promotion channels and efficient dis-
tribution networks. Up until the early 2000s, record companies consid-
ered 360-degree deals to be of little interest, because the cost of diversi-
fication exceeded the expected benefit. First, the key skills required in 
the recorded music market are different from those in ancillary mar-
kets (including live music market), and few labels possessed the necessary 
expertise in these business areas.18 To acquire this expertise, music labels 
had to rely on costly mergers and acquisitions. For example, in June 2007, 
Universal Music Group purchased Sanctuary Group for about 88 million 
dollars. The most valuable assets of the target were not its famous music 
labels but rather its artist career management, merchandising and live 
music businesses.19 Second, in the early 2000s, the value of the live music 
market was small compared with the recorded music market; in the US in 
1999, the turnover of the live music market only amounted to 10% of reve-
nues from recorded music sales.20
18 “The labels do not know how to do anything besides sell records. They don’t know how to sell 
concert tickets or T-shirts. Why should I give them a chunk of my money unless they add some-
thing? I’d rather share that money with a concert professional or a T-shirt specialist.” Peter 
Paterno, Attorney for Dr. Dre, Pearl Jam, Metallica, etc. See: http://articles.latimes.
com/2005/sep/12/ business/fi-korn12 (accessed January 19, 2015).
19 See: http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jun/16/business/fi-universal16 (accessed 
January 19, 2015).
20 Source: Pollstar Magazine for the live music business; RIAA for recorded music sales.
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2.2. The rise of 360-degree deals
Over the period 1999-2010, the value of the live music market increased 
threefold, while turnover in the recorded music market was reduced 
by half. In 2010 in the US, the live music market was worth 61% of the 
recorded music market. This is why record companies now show a much 
greater interest in 360-degree deals. However, although 360-degree deals 
can solve the suboptimality problem of record contracts, they do not solve 
the problem of the weak bargaining power of artists, as we explain below. 
In this respect, 360-degree deals can even present a major pitfall. The loss 
that the artist suffers by sharing his tour revenues with his label is more 
certain than the potential benefit. The former is clearly defined in the 
contract as a percentage of the various revenues included in the deal21 (x% 
of tour revenues, y% of merchandise sales, etc.), whereas the benefits are 
far more intangible. It is far from easy to define objective criteria for the 
efficient management of an artist’s activities, new career opportunities, 
or the benefits of the internalization of market externalities.
We argue that inequality in bargaining power in conventional recording 
contracts has an impact on artists’ willingness to sign 360-degree con-
tracts. Artists with large ancillary revenues are better placed to secure 
a profitable 360-degree deal.22 Yet they may actually be more reluctant, 
because their high direct loss (due to a lower share of the revenues from 
ancillary markets) may not be counterbalanced by the potential benefit 
(in terms of market expansion), which depends on their ability to secure a 
good deal. By contrast, artists who are not currently under contract have 
no choice but to accept such a deal. An unprofitable contract is better than 
no contract, because it allows artists to release an album (without bearing 
the production costs) that will – with a degree of luck – be widely distrib-
uted and benefit from promotion efforts by the label.
21 Here is an extract from a 360-degree deal contract (Karubian, 2009, p. 460): “You 
hereby irrevocably grant and assign to Label and Label is entitled to receive, collect, and keep for 
Label’s own account throughout the Term an amount equal to ____ percent (__ %) of Artist’s 
Net Touring Receipts.”
22 Karubian (2009, p. 442) states that “armed with statistics of their recent tours, merchandise 
sales, and album sales, established artists and their managers can negotiate with labels to arrange 
an exchange of relatively equitable assets: high upfront payments and favorable terms, such as 
higher royalty rates, in return for interest in projected future revenue streams”.
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2.3. Research hypotheses
Based on the insights above, we construct two research hypotheses. First, 
artists who have had a contract in the past may have already experienced 
difficulties in obtaining and securing a good deal with record companies. 
They are therefore less naive than artists who have never had a contract 
with a record company. Hence, we can state our first hypothesis:23
Hypothesis 1. Among the artists who are not currently under contract, those 
who have had a contract with a record label in the past are more reluctant to sign a 
360-degree deal.
Moreover, artists with large ancillary revenues have a high opportunity 
cost of signing a 360-degree deal, because it means, in a negotiation in 
which they have a weak bargaining power, giving up a share of large rev-
enues to the label without tangible benefits. To isolate the “weak bargain-
ing power” effect we only compare the impact of large ancillary revenues 
for artists who are or have been under contract with a record label. We 
can therefore state the second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2. Artists who are or have been under contract and who earn large 
ancillary revenues, i.e., who tour a lot, are more reluctant to accept 360-degree deals 
than artists in the same contractual situation but with low ancillary revenues.
3. DATA
Our dataset comes from a postal survey24 conducted during the autumn 
of 2008 among French musicians who are members of Adami, the French 
organization for the collective administration of performers’ rights. 
23 Another possibility would be to test whether artists under contract (and thus now 
aware of their weak bargaining power with record labels) are less willing to sign 
360-degree deals than unsigned artists. However, such a test is biased because, what-
ever the behavior of the record label, the expected gain of an artist under contract 
is lower than the expected gain of an unsigned artist (for the former, it is the profit 
arising from a 360-degree deal minus the profit arising from a standard contract; for 
the latter, it is just the profit arising from a 360-degree deal).
24 The survey was conducted through a specialized survey company, ISL.
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Adami, which collects the sums paid for the use of artists’ recorded works, 
had over 9,000 musicans among its members in 2008. Only musicians who 
have already participated in an album commercialized by main retailers 
can join Adami. There are also strong incentives for professional musi-
cians to join, because Adami guarantees the collection of royalties on their 
music, especially from radio airplay and TV broadcasts. We addressed a 
questionnaire survey to approximately 4,000 musicians, randomly drawn 
from the 9,000 musicans who are members of Adami. With a response 
rate of about 18%, we ended up with 710 artists in our database.25 However, 
among them 206 artists did not answer to the question which allows us 
to construct our dependent variable. The 504 remaining artists constitute 
the sample we use in this paper.26
3.1. Dependent and explanatory variables
Our dependent variable (360DEAL) is binary and takes the value 1 if the art-
ist answered the following question in the affirmative: “Given your present 
situation, do you consider that a 360-degree contract would be favorable to you?”27 It 
takes the value 0 if the artist answered that he considers that a 360-degree 
contract would be fairly or very unfavorable to him.
To test our first hypothesis, among the artists not under contract at the 
time of the survey, we distinguish between those who have previously had 
a contract with a record company (CONTRACT_BEFORE = 1), and thus may 
have experienced their weak bargaining power, and those who have not 
(CONTRACT_BEFORE = 0). In the regressions below, as far as the contrac-
tual situation is concerned, the reference category corresponds to the art-
ists who are not and have never been under contract with a record label.
The dummy variable LIVE takes the value 1 if the artist performed a lot on 
stage in 2007 (11 times or more), and the value 0 otherwise. We use LIVE as 
25 The information available on the members of Adami allows us to compare our sam-
ple to the full population in terms of gender, age, region of residence, and amount of 
royalties that the artists receive from Adami. The comparison shows that the com-
position of our sample is relatively close to that of the full population.
26 We deal with the possible sample selection issue in the robustness section.
27 We aggregate two positive answers: “very favorable” and “fairly favorable”. We dis-
cuss this aggregation in the robustness section.
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a proxy for the intensity of the artist’s activity in ancillary markets.28 We 
also introduce two dummy variables to distinguish, among artists under 
contract, between those who have a high level of live activity (CONTRACT_
LIVE) and those with a low level (CONTRACT_NOLIVE). We construct the 
dummy variables CONTRACT_ BEFORE_LIVE and CONTRACT_BEFORE_NOLIVE 
in a similar way.
3.2. Main control variables
Besides their weak bargaining power with a record company, there is 
another reason why artists may be reluctant to sign 360-degree deals. In 
the digital age, their outside option - self-releasing their music - became 
much more viable. Of course, self-release strategies have existed for a long 
time. However, according to Burke (1997), up until the 2000s this prac-
tice mainly concerned musicians rejected by record labels. In the digital 
age, lower entry barriers29 have led to a dramatic increase in the num-
ber of new artists who record and distribute their music on their own. In 
May 2009, more than 5 million rock, pop, hip-hop and punk musicians 
or bands were registered on MySpace (Ifpi, 2010). Digitization also allows 
“stars” to self-release their music - see for instance the well-known exam-
ple of the rock band Radiohead, who profitably self-released and self-dis-
tributed their album In Rainbows online in 2007. The new opportunities 
offered by the “do-it-yourself” (DIY) model should reduce the willingness 
to sign 360-degree deals for the artists who feel able to follow such a path.
We therefore control for the entrepreneurial abilities of artists, through 
their self-release experience. The dummy variable SELFRELEASE takes the 
value 1 if the artist is not currently under contract but has self-released an 
album during the three years preceding the survey, and the value 0 other-
wise. We also take into account the fact that artists who have already used 
digital technologies for production and/or promotion may be more prone 
to choose the DIY model. For the recording stage, we use a dummy variable 
28 We have no information on other ancillary markets such as merchandising or spon-
soring. However, the live music market is the most important of these ancillary mar-
kets. See footnote 16.
29 Byrne (2007) points out that with digitization, recording costs have sharply declined, 
manufacturing and distribution costs approach zero and promotion costs are also 
much lower (online promotion is almost free through Facebook, blogs, etc.).
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reflecting the use of a homestudio (HOMESTUDIO). A homestudio is com-
posed of a computer, some relevant software and additional devices, and 
it allows artists to record their music with almost professional quality. 
For the distribution/promotion stage, we use a variable that reflects the 
extent to which artists use MySpace to promote their music towards pub-
lic or professionals (record companies, concert promoters, etc.). MySpace 
is a social network founded in 2003, which was, at the time of our sur-
vey, the main social network for musicians (it has now been superseded 
by Facebook). In 2008, about 120 million users and 5 million musicians 
had a page on MySpace. Usually, an artist’s page offered songs for down-
load or streaming, photos, videos, a biography, tour dates, and a list of 
the artist’s friends. MySpace offered a free promotion tool, and negotia-
tions with local concert promoters were much easier when the artist could 
boast of many “friends” on MySpace living in the region. In our survey, 
artists were asked how frequently they updated their MySpace page: at 
least every week (reference category), every month (MYSPACE2 = 1, 0 other-
wise), or less frequently (MYSPACE1 = 1, 0 otherwise). We also consider art-
ists who had no MySpace page (MYSPACE0 = 1, 0 otherwise).
3.3. Other control variables
Our main assumption is that an artist who has already experienced diffi-
culties in securing a good deal with a record label will be more reluctant 
to sign a 360-degree deal. However, this reluctance may be mitigated for 
some artists. For instance, an artist’s level of education could have a posi-
tive effect on his willingness to sign a 360-degree deal: the more educated 
an artist is, the more able he is, or believes himself to be, to bargain with a 
record label. We therefore introduce a dummy variable (HIGHEDUCATION), 
which takes the value of 1 if the artist has at least a Master’s degree. 
Likewise, successful artists should exhibit a higher bargaining power 
because they are able to obtain a contract from several record companies. 
GOLD is a variable that reflects the artist’s success; it takes the value 1 if 
the artist has already won a music award and/or a gold record. We expect 
successful artists to be less reluctant to sign a 360-degree deal. We also 
include the dummy variable MANAGER, which takes the value 1 if the artist 
has a manager helping him to find and negociate commitments and busi-
ness opportunities, and in particular a 360-degree deal. Conversely, artists 
with managers may be more aware of the pitfalls of record contracts and 
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of the difficulties in avoiding them, and they may therefore be more reluc-
tant towards 360-degree deals. Thus, the overall effect of the MANAGER 
variable is indeterminate.
We include as independent variables the artists’ ages (AGE1 to AGE5: from 
25 years old or less to 65 years old or more), whether they live outside 
the Paris area (NONPARIS), and their gender (GENDER equals 1 if the art-
ist is a female). We also control for other characteristics that could affect 
the artists’ attitudes towards 360-degree deals. An artist’s annual per-
sonal income (INCOME1 to INCOME5: from less than 9,000 euros to more 
than 60,000 euros) could affect the way he views 360-degree contracts: 
the higher his income, the lower his willingness to share his revenues 
with his label. We also include a dummy variable to identify artists who 
perform “popular” genres of music (POPULAR), that is to say a music that 
targets large audiences and mass distribution. Since the first and highly-
publicized 360-degree deals were signed by popular music artists such as 
Robbie Williams and Madonna, this could positively influence the opin-
ion of other popular music artists about the opportuneness of signing 
such deals. We also include a variable to account for a specificity of the 
French music market: the intermittence system. This system allows artists 
who experience periods of unemployment during a given year to receive 
benefits provided that they reach a minimal threshold of activity within 
that year. INTERMITTENT is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the art-
ist did receive such benefits during the previous year. An artist who ben-
efits from the intermittence system has to negotiate frequently with pro-
fessionals in the music industry, including record labels if he works as 
a session musician. He is therefore probably more aware of the poten-
tial behaviour of music labels and should be more reluctant towards 
360-degree deals.
Finally, we also consider the impact of the piracy issue on the willing-
ness to sign a 360-degree deal. Piracy may reduce the ability of a record 
company to internalize the positive externalities that exist between the 
recorded music market and the live music market. By reducing the value 
of the recorded music market, piracy reduces the potential additional gain 
that 360-degree deals generate, and thus reduces the artists’ willingness to 
sign such deals. We therefore include the dummy variable PIRACY, which 
takes the value of 1 if the artist thinks that digital piracy has a very nega-
tive or fairly negative impact on his album sales, and 0 otherwise.
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Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1 below and the contruction of the 
variables is described in Table 5 in the Appendix.
Tableau 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
360DEAL 504 .464 .499
CONTRACT 504 .242 .429
LIVE 498 .524 .500
CONTRACT_LIVE 498 .165 .371
CONTRACT_NOLIVE 498 .077 .267
CONTRACT_BEFORE 484 .397 .490
CONTRACT_BEFORE_LIVE 478 .176 .381
CONTRACT_BEFORE_NOLIVE 478 .220 .414
SELFRELEASE 484 .385 .487
HOMESTUDIO 497 .644 .479
MYSPACE3 504 .244 .430
MYSPACE2 504 .149 .356
MYSPACE1 504 .163 .369
MYSPACE0 504 .425 .495
AGE1 504 .022 .146
AGE2 504 .119 .324
AGE3 504 .310 .463
AGE4 504 .319 .467
AGE5 504 .216 .412
INCOME1 475 .234 .423
INCOME2 475 .223 .417
INCOME3 475 .324 .469
INCOME4 475 .185 .389
INCOME5 475 .034 .181
GENDER 503 .417 .494
HIGHEDUCATION 494 .496 .500
NONPARIS 504 .528 .500
POPULAR 504 .256 .437
INTERMITTENT 501 .445 .497
GOLD 504 .202 .402
MANAGER 500 .194 .396
PIRACY 490 .569 .496
Note: The number of observations varies across variables because of ques-
tions not answered by some artists.
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4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS
A basic descriptive analysis of our data supports our hypotheses. As 
shown in Table 2, artists currently under contract or who have previously 
been signed by a music label – and who are thus aware of the informa-
tion asymmetry they suffer in their relationship with their label – are 
less likely to consider a 360-degree deal as a favourable opportunity for 
them (Hypothesis 1). Artists with large ancillary revenues are also less 
interested by a 360-degree deal probably because their opportunity cost is 
higher (Hypothesis 2).
Tableau 2. Descriptive analysis of our hypotheses
Artist’s situation Consider a 360-degree 
deal as favourable for 
him (360deal = 1)
Frequency (%)
Under contract 39.3
Not under contract but have had a contract previously 42.7
Never under contract 55.3
Under contrat with an intensive live music activity 30.5
Not under contract but have had a contract previously 
with an intensive live music activity




These descriptive results should of course be confirmed by an economet-
ric analysis. Since our dependent variable (360DEAL) is binary, we estimate 
the following probit model:
Pt = Pr (360DEAL = 1) = Φ(β0 + βXt)
where Pt is the probability that 360DEAL = 1 for observation t, Xt is a vector 
of explanatory variables (including control variables), and β is the param-
eter vector to be estimated. All results presented below include robust 
standard-errors to encounter for possible heteroscedasticity.
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4.1. Main results
In our regressions, the reference category is the artists who do not have 
a contract and never have had one. We compare the attitude towards 
360-degree deals of this subpopulation with the attitude of three other sub-
populations: artists without a current contract but who have had one in the 
past, artists under contract with intensive live activity and artists under 
contract with no live activity. We first test Hypothesis 1. Regression (1) 
in Table 3 allows us to check that ceteris paribus, artists without a current 
contract but who have had one in the past (CONTRACT_BEFORE) are signif-
icantly more reluctant to accept a 360-degree deal than artists who have 
never had a contract (the reference category). Since both types of artists 
are not currently under contract, the only difference that could explain 
their attitude towards 360-degree deals is their past experience of record 
companies and the difficulties in bargaining they have experienced.
Table 4 presents the marginal effects30. It shows that for artists not cur-
rently under contract, previous experience of a contractual relationship 
with a music label reduces the probability of considering 360-degree deals 
to be favorable by 12 percentage points, compared with artists who have 
no such experience.
Regressions (1) and (2) in Table 3 validate our second hypothesis. The 
higher the revenues that an artist under contract may have to share 
with his record label – because he tours a lot (CONTRACT_LIVE) – the less 
likely he is to consider 360-degree deals to be favorable. Being under con-
tract and touring a lot reduces the probability that an artist will con-
sider 360-degree deals to be favorable by 22 percentage points, compared 
with artists who have never had a contract. This is not the case for artists 
under contract who perform little on stage (CONTRACT_NOLIVE). We obtain 
a similar result, though to a lesser extent and less significantly, when 
CONTRACT_BEFORE and LIVE are interacted. Artists without a current con-
tract but who have had one in the past are less willing to sign 360-degree 
deals when they perform a lot on stage. Note that when the LIVE variable 
30 The calculation of marginal effects in a Probit model can be tricky in the presence of 
interaction terms (Norton et al., 2005). However, in our Probit model we don’t esti-
mate joint effect and single effect but only joint effect. Thus, we don’t face the prob-
lem expressed in Norton et al. (2005).
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is not interacted, it turns out to be non-significant (see regression (3)). 
Intensive live activity per se does not make an artist more reluctant to sign 
a 360-degree deal. The reluctance actually comes from the combination 
of touring a lot and having previous experience of a relationship with a 
record label.
Tableau 3. Main probit regressions31
360DEAL:  
Dependent variable



























































MYSPACE 3 (reference category)













31 Since only a few artists belong to the category AGE1, we also use as the reference cat-
egory AGE1 and AGE2 grouped together. This generates no change in our results.
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N 424 424 424 478
Prob > chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001***
Pseudo-R2 0.105 0.105 0.100 0.026 
chi2 59.861 59.786 56.745 16.527 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Since some artists do not answer to questions used to construct our independent varia-
bles, the sample used in our regressions (424 observations) is smaller than the sample of 
artists who have answered to the question that allows us to build our dependent varia-
ble (504 observations).
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Tableau 4. Marginal effects











* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
(a) changes in the probability that 360DEAL = 1 are for discrete changes 
of each explanatory dummy variable from 0 to 1
As far as the main control variables are concerned, entrepreneurial expe-
rience, as well as using digital tools at the production stage, have the 
expected effect on artists’ attitudes towards 360-degree deals. We find that 
artists not under contract but who have self-released an album in the past 
three years, reflecting entrepreneurial abilities, are less likely to consider 
360-degree deals to be favorable than artists who have not self-released an 
album (–13 percentage points in the probability of considering such a deal 
to be favorable). Likewise, artists who use a homestudio are less interested 
in 360-degree contracts (–13 percentage points). However, digitization at 
the promotion level has no impact on artists’ attitudes towards 360-degree 
deals. Artists who update their MySpace page frequently are not signif-
icantly less willing to sign a 360-degree deal. We might have expected 
that the more an artist is active on MySpace, the more he considers him-
self able to self-promote. He should therefore be less willing to accept a 
360-degree deal. This result is consistent with other work that shows that 
although musicians are very active on social networks (posting videos on 
YouTube, tweeting, etc.), this activity is not yet reflected in any signif-
icant increase in their audience (Bourreau et al., 2014). Self-promotion 
online is probably more difficult than was anticipated.
We also note that high income artists (INCOME5) are less likely to con-
sider as favorable a 360-degree deal that would entail sharing some of this 
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income with his record label. The marginal effect is 32 percentage points 
compared with artists belonging to the lowest category of income. Most 
of the other control variables are also significant and have the expected 
sign. The coefficient of POPULAR is positive and significant. Artists who 
have at least degree-level education (HIGHEDUCATION) are also signifi-
cantly more favorable towards 360-degree deals. Finally, artists who hired 
a professional to help them to manage their career (MANAGER) are sig-
nificantly more reluctant to sign a 360-degree deal. Conversely, digital 
piracy (PIRACY) does not seem to affect the willingness of artists to sign 
a 360-degree deal and successful artists are not less reluctant to sign a 
360-degree deal (GOLD is not significant). This suggests that these artists 
might also encounter difficulties in negotiating with record labels (see the 
example of the Beatles/EMI dispute on sub-section 2.1).
4.2. Robustness checks
A potential pitfall with our empirical estimation is the possible endoge-
neity of the CONTRACT and LIVE variables. An unobserved variable might 
simultaneously affect both the contractual situation or concert activities 
of an artist and his attitude towards 360-degree deals. The celebrity and/
or success of an artist, his bargaining power, or his ability to secure a 
good deal could play such a role. Note that we already take into account 
the  success/fame of an artist in our regressions with the variable GOLD. 
Likewise, we also include the variable MANAGER, which captures at least 
part of an artist’s bargaining power and his ability to secure a good deal. 
However, we test for the exogeneity of the two variables CONTRACT and 
LIVE (see Appendix 2 for an explanation of the exogeneity test undertaken).
A second potential issue is that we are not observing the equation for the 
population as a whole, since 29% of the artists in our sample did not answer 
the question on 360-degree contracts. It is possible that only the artists 
who felt capable of or interested in signing such a contract answered the 
question. When compared with the remaining artists, the proportion of 
artists currently under contract is lower among these 206 artists. They 
also use digital tools less often to record their musical projects. Our results 
might therefore suffer from a selection bias that the Heckman selection 
estimation can solve by estimating the probability of being favorable to 
360-degree contracts, conditional on whether or not the artist answered 
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the relevant question. We ran such a Heckman selection estimation32. The 
first equation is a probit on a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
artist answered the question on 360-degree contracts (SELECTION). The sec-
ond equation is our previous probit equation. We add to the exogenous var-
iables a dummy variable (BROADBAND) that takes the value 1 if the artist 
has broadband Internet access at home. As required, this exogenous var-
iable affects the probability that the artists answer to the question on 
360-degree contracts.33 A simple probit between SELECTION and BROADBAND 
shows that such a correlation is very significant (p < 0.000). We checked 
that the exclusion condition is verified by estimating the main regres-
sion and adding the variable BROADBAND which is not significant. Indeed 
there is no reason to believe that having a broadband Internet access at 
home could directly affect the attitude towards 360-degree deal.34 Table 8 
in Appendix 3 shows that our estimations do not suffer from a selection 
bias (formally we cannot reject the independence of both equations, since 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that ρ = 0).
We also made several other robustness checks.35 First of all, we checked 
that our results are robust when we use sample weights that adjust for dif-
ferences between our sample and the full population of Adami members, 
according to gender, age, region of residence, and amount of royalties 
the artist receives from Adami36. In the survey, artists were asked how 
many times they had performed on stage in the last twelve months, and 
four answers were proposed: 0, 1 to 10, 11 to 50, and more than 50 times. 
We aggregated the first two and the last two modes, since this configura-
tion provides more significant results. However, we also ran our regres-
sion with live concerts taken as a continuous variable, without signifi-
32 We ran an estimation following Van de Ven and van Praag (1981) that adapt the 
standard Heckman procedure to allow for a double probit selection.
33 Generally speaking, BROADBAND is also very significantly negatively correlated with 
the number of questions non-answered in the survey.
34 Whereas using the social network Myspace could have affected this attitude – because 
Myspace is a tool for self-promotion – having a broadband Internet access at home 
reflects more widely familiarity of the artist with technological progress.
35 The regression results relating to these robustness checks are available upon request 
from the authors.
36 Standard errors are relatively high (Table 1) and could be due to the relative small 
size of our sample
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cant changes in our results. Likewise, four answers were proposed for the 
question on 360-degree deals (“very favorable”/“fairly favorable”/“fairly 
unfavorable”/“very unfavorable”). In our main regressions, we con-
structed the binary variable 360DEAL by grouping together the first two 
and the last two answers. Though this binary variable best fits our data, 
we also ran estimations with an ordered probit with the four answers, 
and obtained similar qualitative results. Our SELFRELEASE variable iden-
tifies artists who self-released an album in the past three years and who 
are not currently under contract. We checked that our results remain 
unchanged when we consider self-release behavior whatever the present 
contractual situation of the artists. Finally, our database contains a few 
inactive artists, who could have a biased opinion on 360-degree deals. 
We therefore ran our estimations on the subsample of “active” artists, 
that is, artists who had either worked on recording sessions or performed 
live at least once in the last twelve months. Our main results remained 
unchanged.
5. DISCUSSION
Our results confirm that the contractual experience of artists with record 
companies reduces the willingness of the former to sign 360-degree deals. 
Without being currently under contract, the mere experience of a past 
contractual relationship with a record label is sufficient to make artists 
consider 360-degree deals to be unfavorable. In our regressions, since we 
control for a large set of variables (age, musical genre, self-release experi-
ence, use of digital technology, piracy, etc.) only this contractual experi-
ence – and therefore the real experience of the difficulties encountered 
to secure a favorable deal with a record label – seems able to explain the 
difference in attitudes. Interestingly enough, artists who hired a man-
ager – and are thus probably more aware of the harshness of contractual 
relationships within the music industry – are more reluctant towards 
360-degree deals.
Artists under contract who play a lot of concerts are also less willing to 
sign such contracts. They seem to fear that the benefits they can obtain 
by internalizing the positive externality that recorded music generates 
for ancillary markets will be lower than their opportunity cost. They are 
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certain to lose a share of their high revenues from live concerts but are 
not sure to be able to secure a good deal with their record label. They tend 
to be therefore more reluctant to sign 360-degree deals.
Finally, our results explain the difficulties that recording labels encoun-
ter in implementing profit-enhancing 360-degree deals and thus why they 
still represent a small share of music industry revenues (see the introduc-
tion). The artists who are more favorable to such contracts are the lesser-
known artists, who are not, and never have been, under contract. For 
them, “any deal is a good deal”, and their lack of experience of a con-
tractual relationship with a record label may lead them to underestimate 
the opportunistic behavior of labels. However, artists not under contract 
but with experience of self-releasing, and who therefore probably have 
some entrepreneurial abilities, are less prone to sign 360-degree contracts. 
Likewise, the most profitable artists, i.e., those under contract and who 
play a lot of concerts, are also reluctant to sign 360-degree deals. They pre-
fer to keep a traditional contract in which they manage and retain most of 
the revenues from concerts. Finally, digitization, which is the raison d’être 
of 360-degree contracts, also weakens them by enhancing the potential of 
the do-it-yourself model.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The recorded music industry considers 360-degree deals as one way to 
counteract the downturn in music sales they have experienced since the 
beginning of this century and the rise of digital music. Such deals allow 
music labels to benefit from the growing ancillary markets (including the 
live music market) whose growth comes at least partly from the positive 
externality that recorded music (whether legally or illegally consumed) 
 generates for them. In the present paper, we have studied whether the 
interests of music labels and artists are aligned in such deals. Theoretically 
they should be, since the internalization of this externality increases the 
total surplus and should allow record labels to improve their profits while 
maintaining at least stable revenues for artists. Furthermore, the greater 
the market externality, the greater the benefits of the internalization 
should be for both parties. Hence, the most successful artists should be the 
most willing to sign 360-degree deals.
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Yet 360-degree deals remain quite scarce, and mainly involve either stars 
(in exchange for massive cash advances) or artists signing their first con-
tract. In this paper we have analyzed the incentives and pitfalls artists 
encounter in signing 360-degree deals. In particular, we have investigated 
whether artists fear that their weaker bargaining power relative to that 
of the record labels will prevent them from securing a good deal, and 
whether this can explain why they are reluctant to let labels manage all 
of their music-related activities.
Using a representative survey of professional musicians in France, our 
main findings support the hypothesis that artists fear that signing a 
360-degree contract will not be favorable for them. For artists currently 
without a contract, having had a contract in the past reduces the will-
ingness to sign a 360-degree deal, all other things being equal. This sug-
gests that these artists are aware of the difficulties inherent in contrac-
tual relationships with record labels. Moreover, the greater the revenues 
an artist has to share, i.e., the more he performs on stage, the more reluc-
tant he will be to sign a 360-degree deal. Finally, the artists who are the 
most willing to accept such deals are those who do not have and never 
have had a contract with a record label. However, they are also probably 
the least profitable artists for the record labels.
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APPENDIX 1
Tableau 5. Description of the variables
Variable Description
360DEAL takes the value 1 if the artist declared to be interested in 
signing a 360 degree deal, and 0 otherwise.
CONTRACT takes the value 1 if the artist is under contract, and 0 othe-
rwise.
LIVE takes the value 1 if the artist performed more than 10 times on 
stage during the previous year, and 0 otherwise.
CONTRACT_LIVE takes the value 1 if both CONTRACT and LIVE take the value 1, 
and 0 otherwise.
CONTRACT_NOLIVE takes the value 1 if CONTRACT takes the value 1 and LIVE takes 
the value 0, and 0 otherwise.
CONTRACT_BEFORE takes the value 1 if the artist is not under contract but has been 
under contract with a record label in the past, and 0 otherwise
CONTRACT_BEFORE_
LIVE
takes the value 1 if both CONTRACT_BEFORE and LIVE take the 
value 1, and 0 otherwise.
CONTRACT_BEFORE_
NOLIVE
takes the value 1 if CONTRACT_BEFORE takes the value 1 and 
LIVE takes the value 0, and 0 otherwise.
SELFRELEASE takes the value 1 if the artist is not currently under contract but 
had self-released an album during the three years preceding 
the survey, and 0 otherwise.
HOMESTUDIO takes the value 1 if the artist has a homestudio, and 0 othe-
rwise.
MYSPACE3 takes the value 1 if the artist updates his MySpace page at least 
every week, 0 otherwise
MYSPACE2 takes the value 1 if the artist updates his MySpace page at least 
every month, 0 otherwise 
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MYSPACE1 takes the value 1 if the artist updates his MySpace page less 
frequently than every month, 0 otherwise
MYSPACE0 takes the value 1 if the artist does not have a MySpace page, 0 
otherwise
AGE1 takes the value 1 if the artist is less than 25 years old, 0 othe-
rwise
AGE2 takes the value 1 if the artist is between 25 and 34 years old, 0 
otherwise
AGE3 takes the value 1 if the artist is between 35 and 44 years old, 0 
otherwise
AGE4 takes the value 1 if the artist is between 45 and 54 years old, 0 
otherwise
AGE5 takes the value 1 if the artist is more than 54 years old, 0 othe-
rwise
INCOME1 takes the value 1 if the artist earned less than €9,000 in 2007, 
and 0 otherwise.
INCOME2 takes the value 1 if the artist earned between €9,000 and 
€15,000 in 2007, and 0 otherwise.
INCOME3 takes the value 1 if the artist earned between €15,000 and 
€30,000 in 2007, and 0 otherwise.
INCOME4 takes the value 1 if the artist earned between €30,000 and 
€60,000 in 2007, and 0 otherwise.
INCOME5 takes the value 1 if the artist earned more than €60,000 in 
2007, and 0 otherwise.
GENDER takes the value 1 if the artist is a woman, and 0 otherwise.
HIGHEDUCATION takes the value 1 if the artist holds a Master’s degree (at least), 
and 0 otherwise.
NONPARIS takes the value 1 if the artist does not live in Paris or in the «Ile 
de France» region (i.e., in the Paris area), and 0 otherwise.
POPULAR takes the value 1 if the artist declares that his main musical 
genre, is popular music, and 0 otherwise.
INTERMITTENT takes the value 1 if the artist receives a monetary compensa-
tion during the previous year from the intermittence system, and 
0 otherwise
GOLD takes the value 1 if the artist has already won a music award 
and/or a gold record, and 0 otherwise.
MANAGER takes the value 1 if the artist has a manager, and 0 otherwise.
PIRACY takes the value 1 if the artist considers that piracy hurts his 
own recorded music sales.
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APPENDIX 2
To test for the exogeneity of the CONTRACT variable, we use as instrumental 
variable (IV) the variable WEBPAGE, which is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the artist has a web page, and the value 0 otherwise. We argue 
that WEBPAGE satisfies exclusion and inclusion restrictions. First, there is 
no reason to believe that having a web page could have a direct effect on 
the dependent variable (the opinion on 360-degree deals). A web page is 
indeed really different from a MySpace page and is often merely devoted 
to an information role, not to an active promotion. Second, WEBPAGE is 
correlated with CONTRACT (the p-value is lower than 0.01 in a simple probit 
model with CONTRACT as dependent variable and WEBPAGE as independent 
variable). The inclusion restriction of our IV is thus also satisfied. Since 
our potentially endogenous variable (CONTRACT) is binary, we cannot use 
an IV procedure to test for the exogeneity of CONTRACT using WEBPAGE 
as an instrumental variable. As suggested by Wooldridge (2002), we run 
a bivariate probit with our structural probit, and a second probit using 
CONTRACT as the dependent variable and including our IV in the covari-
ates. A bivariate probit approach provides a test of exogeneity. Under the 
exogeneity assumption, the error terms of both corresponding underlying 
equations included in the bivariate probit are not correlated, that is, the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity can be stated as ρ = 0. A likelihood ratio test 
of the significance of ρ is thus a direct test of the exogeneity of CONTRACT. 
If ρ ≠ 0, only the results of the bivariate probit have to be considered. But 
if ρ = 0, it is appropriate to use the univariate probit model. In Table 5 
below, columns 2 and 3 display the results of the bivariate probit. The sec-
ond column corresponds to the regression with CONTRACT as the depend-
ent variable, and includes the IV. It confirms that the instrumental var-
iable WEBPAGE is correlated with CONTRACT. Table 6 also reports that the 
estimated value for the parameter ρ is not significantly different from 
zero. These results suggest that CONTRACT is indeed exogeneous (formally, 
we cannot reject the exogeneity of CONTRACT, using WEBPAGE as an instru-
mental variable, since we cannot reject the hypothesis that ρ = 0). Finally, 
for the same reasons, we could imagine the LIVE variable is also endoge-
nous. Talent or bargaining power could impact both the success on stage 
of an artist and his or his willingness to sign a 360-degree deal. Using 
WEBPAGE as an instrumental variable (which is positively correlated with 
LIVE in a simple probit with p < 0.000), we find that we cannot reject the 
exogeneity of LIVE (see Table 7).
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LR test of ρ = 0:     chi2(1) = 0.1007     Prob > chi2 = 0.7510
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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LR test of ρ = 0:     chi2(1) = 0.0037     Prob > chi2 = 0.9517
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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APPENDIX 3
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LR test of ρ = 0:     chi2(1) = 1.89     Prob > chi2 = 0.1695
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
